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THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF A
CONTRACT CREATED BY ACTION IN RELIANCE
IF A makes a promise to B and later fails to perform it, there are three
pogsible consequences of a suit by B against A. B may take nothing by the
promise; it may be fully enforced, specifically or in damages; or it may be
the basis for reparatory damages only.' The measure of recovery will be
the measure of A's legal duty to B resulting from the promise. To create
any duty at all, the law has required some further factor than the bare promise,
and as there -developed other bases for enforcing a promise than the quid
pro quo of debt, the name consideration was attached to whatever other
factors made it apparent that the promise ought to be enforced.
2 The doctrine
of consideration, as applied case by case, had no other consistency. Although
consideration could be loosely described as a benefit to the promisor or a
detriment to the promisee, it was not until Holmes that the theory of benefit
or detriment as a mutual inducement for the promise became fully aieticu-
lated.3 Substantially that definition was adopted by the American Law Insti-
tute.4 Yet Holmes also thought consideration to be as much a matter of form
as the seal, 5 betraying, perhaps, that his analysis imported a certain rigidity.0
If consideration was to be so narrowly defined, there had to be some provision
in the Restatement for those cases which hold the promisor to his promise
when there has been no conventional inducing return promise or performance.
Section 90 of the Restatement says definite and substantial action in reliance
on a promise, which the promisor should reasonably have foreseen, will make
the promise binding, if injustice can only so be avoided. 7
1. The term reparatory damages is intended to include both restitution and reliance
dimages.
2. See ANsoN, CONTRACTS (Corbin's ed. 1924) 75 et seq., 120 et seq., 121, it. 1;
CoRBnIr, CASES ON CONTRAcrs (2d ed. 1933) 196-214; GT. BRIT. LAW RrV. (,Comm.,
SiXTHa INTERIm REPORT (1937) 12 et seq.; HOLMES, TuE ComxoN LAW (1881) 251 el
seq.; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 99; Ames, The History of Assumpsit
(1888) 2 HARv. -L. REV. 1.
3. ". . . the promise and the consideration must purport to be the motive each
for the other in whole or at least in part. It is not enough that the promise induces the
detrimentor that the detriment induces the promise, if the other half is wanting.", Holmes,
J., in Wisconsin & M. Ry. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379, 386 (1903). "It would cut up the
doctrine of consideration by the roots if a promisee could make a gratuitous promise
binding by subsequently acting in reliance on it." Holmes, ., in Commonwealth v. Scit-
uate Savings Bank, 137 Mass. 301, 302 (1884). Accord; McGovern v. New Yorlk, 234
N. Y. 377, 138N. E. 26 (1923) ; cf. Rice v. Almy, 32 Conn. 297, 304 (1864) and Justice
Holmes in Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114, 60 N. E. 397 (1901).
4. REsTATEmE,:,T, CoNTRAcrs (1932) § 75. Consideration must be "bargained for
and given in exchange for the promise."
5r ,, e Krell ,. Codnan, 154 Mass, 454, 456, 28 N. E. 578 (1891),
&,. qC~T~pare,Justice Holmes' Search or a. definite rule of law in torts. Baltimore
& 0. R. R. v. Goodm~an, 275 *U. S' 6 6 (1927).
7. Adoption of this doctrine is now being urged in England. GT. BirT. LAW REV.
Comm., supra note 2, at 24.
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Considerable uncertainty is inherent in the Section, resulting from the
attempt of the Restatement to unify an unusually diverse body of decisions
by redefinition. Particularly perplexing is the further problem created by the
Restatement's distinction between promises enforceable by reason of reliance
and promises enforceable because consideration exists. That problem is
whether the duty created by action in reliance should continue to be enforced
up to the promisee's full expectation, or whether reliance damages alone should
be awarded. It has long been "ancient learning" that a promise supported
by consideration thereby embodies a duty co-extensive with its terms, and
that, conversely, a promise not so supported is undum pactun s.8 It has there-
fore been urged that if mere action in reliance is to raise a duty in the
promisor, the duty must be co-extensive not with the promise but rather
with the action, as ex hypothesi there is no consideration, no contract, and
the duty of the promisor can at most be only to restore the stalus quo.o But
as soon as the creation of a duty by a promise was recognized at all by the
common law, that duty was extended to the limit of the promise-to the
expectation interest. The duty of the promisor was later said to be bottomed
upon consideration, and recently the idea of consideration has been refined
to include only a bargained-for exchange. But assuming that a contract is
"a promise . . . the performance of which the law in some way recognizes
as a duty,"'10 there is a considerable body of enforced promises that have
not had consideration as so defined by Holmes. Consideration, instead of
being essential to enforcement of the whole promise, may be but one of several
grounds for enforcement. And for contracts in which consideration does not
exist in its modern restricted form, there seems to be no reason why enforce-
ment should not be granted to the full extent to which promises were enforced
when consideration was a broad and unanalyzed term-namely, to the full ex-
pectation interest of the promisee. An examination of the reliance cases may
disclose whether they are the result of a faulty conception of what should
make a promise enforceable, whether reliance damages alone should be given
if damage is shown, or whether there are oilier well-established reasons for
enforcing the full promise than a bargained-for exchange. 21
8. ". . . . consideration is the universal requisite of contracts not tnder seal,"
ANso,, CO NTRACrS (Corbin's ed. 1924) 120; ef. the 1930 edition at page 121 ct seq.
See 1 WMLISTON, Co rNMAcrs (Rev. ed. 1936) § 99; Corbin, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the
Law of Contracts (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 426, 430, 39 COL L. Rmv. '6, 60, 52 HAnv L
RE. 408, 412.
9. Shattuck, Gratuitous Pronises-.4 New 11'rit? (1937) 35 .Mfie. L. REV. Q3;
Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts (1932) 46 H.nv. L
REv. 1, 22; cf. Fuller, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (1936-1937) 45 Y%La
L. j. 52, 373, at 64-66, 69-71, 401-420. Contra: 1 Wn.usTox. Co=mwrs (Rev. ed.
1936)- § 140 and Professor Williston as reported in Ain:Rrc.%: L.w I'STITcT. Pnfct n-
mdz Vol: IV, Appendix (1926) 85-114.
10. RESTATEMENT, CONTasCrS (1932) § 1.
"11. Problems involving "past consideration" are omitted from this discussion.
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A. PROMISES TO MAKE A Girr
Usually held enforceable are promises to give money if the promisee will
move and live next to the promisor,12 or remain sober and virtuous,", or
refrain from smoking or drinking. 4 In such cases the action of the promisee
is usually bargained-for, and at least the form of the promise will support
a finding that performance of the condition was the consideration. But in
a promise to pay for a trip to Europe,'3 or for education,'0 a bargained-for
exchange is more difficult to discover. Courts are apt to say the trip was
taken at the promisor's request and is therefore sufficient "consideration".
In fact neither the trip nor the expenditure made in pursuit of education
readily fit conventional ideas of a bargained-for exchange. It is really the
unfairness of leaving the promise unenforced after reliance, bargained-for or
not, that prompts the result. So with a promise to pay for land,11 a house,18
a mill,'0 or a warehouse,20 on the faith of which the promisee incurs the
liability suggested. Promises to keep up the salaries of those going to war,21
or to give money that the promisee need not work have been similarly en-
forced.22 It is true the desire for the action of the promisee in these cases
may very likely be the inducing cause for the promise, or its motive, but
motive is not a criterion of consideration; and stating the promise as coupled
with a request is generally a fiction. The bare promise is enforced because
the promisee, as should be expected, has depended on it. As the reliance is
co-extensive with the promise, the whole promise is of course enforced.
Marriage Settlements: The marriage settlement cases have caused some
doctrinal difficulty because the only tangible detriment incurred in reliance
12. Adams v. Honness, 62 Barb. 326 (N. Y. 1872); cf. Matter of Cole, 202 App. Div.
546, 195 N. Y. Supp. 541 (2d Dep't 1922).
13. Dunton v. Dunton, 18 Vict. L. R. 114 (1892); ef. Werner v. Werner, 169 App.
Div. 9, 154 N. Y. Supp. 570 (1st Dep't 1915).
14. Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538, 27 N. E. 256 (1891); Lindell v. Rokes, 60
Mo. 249 (1875); cf. Daykin v. Daykin, 1 Ohio L. Abs. 536 (1923).
15. Devecmon v. Shaw, 69 Md. 199, 14 At. 464 (1888).
16. Young v. Boyd, 107 Md. 449, 69 Atl. 33 (1908); Robinson v. Hayes' Estate,
207 App. Div. 718, 202 N. Y. Supp. 732 (3d Dep't 1924), aff'd, 239 N. Y. 512, 147 N. E.
175 (1924).
17. Berry v. Graddy, 58 Ky. 553 (1859). Accord: Homan v. Steele, 18 Neb. 652,
26 N. W. 472 (1886). But cf. In re Estate of Fisher, 128 Ore. 415, 274 Pac. 1098
(1929).
18. Crosbie v. M'Doual, 13 Ves. 148 (Ch. 1806); Herron v. Brinton, 18 Iowa 60,
175 N. W. 831 (1920) semble.
19. Steele v. Steele, 75 Md. 477, 23 Atl. 959 (1892).
20. Skidmore v. Bradford, L. R. 8 Eq. 134 (1869).
21. Davies v. Rhondda Dist. Urban Council, 87 L. J. K. B. (N.s.) 166 (C. A. 1917).
Accord: Board of Commissioners v. Mertz, 27 Ind. 103 (1866) ; Board of Commission-
ers v. '"ood, 39 Ind. 345 (1872) ; cf. State v. Lum, 95 Conn. 199, 111 At. 190 (1920)
State ex rel. Hess v. City of Akron, 56 Ohio App. 28, 10 N. E. (2d) 1 (1936).
22. Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N. W. 365 (1898) ; De Paola v. Greenspan,
167 Misc. 467, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 590 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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on the settlement is the performance of the contract to marry, a pre-existing
legal duty. But whether or not the explanation is that the performance of
a pre-existing duty to a third person, here the fianc6(e), may be a con-
sideration,2 courts have held the occurrence of the marriage a sufficient
reason for enforcing the promise.2 4 In fact, the promisor may not have
bargained for the .marriage, which would negative conventional consideration.
As for reliance, the promisee might have married without the promise, leav-
ing as the reliance-detriment only the disappointment of an expectation held
when the marriage took place. Although mere disappointment has not attained
explicit recognition as a detriment, there is no consistent explanation of all
these cases other than that expectation alone will, at least in this moral
atmosphere, induce the courts to preserve the promisee's expectation and
turn the promise into a contract. Here again there is no suggestion the duty
should be limited to anything less than the terms of the promise, as there is
no practical way to determine the monetary extent of the reliance.
Charitable Subscriptions: Although it has been urged they should be
treated as sui generi,2 the charitable subscription cases are nonetheless abun-
dant authority for the proposition that action induced by a promise is suffi-
cient to make the promise enforceable.2 G The subscription was at first enforced
only if a request for the action could be implied so that the action could be
thought of as bargained-for.27 Later the implication became increasingly arti-
ficial, leading to recognition that the request was unnecessary 2 s The objection
23. See De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431, 117 N. E. 807 (1917) ; 1 WiLutsTo.z,
CoNAcrs (Rev. ed. 1936) §§ 131, 103D; Corbin, Does a Pre-exisling Duly Defcat Con-
sideration? (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 362.
24. De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431, 117 N. E. 807 (1917) ; Phalen v. United
States Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 178, 78 N. E. 943 (1906); Shadwell v. Shadwell, 9 C. B.
N. S. 159 (1860). But cf. Ayliffe v. Mr. Justice Tracy, 2 P. Vms. 65 (Cli. 1722). Cf.
Nicholson v. Acme Cement Plaster Co., 145 Mo. App. 523, 122 S. WX. 773 (1909).
25. Billig, The Problcm of Consideration in Charitable Subscriptions (1927) 12
CoRN. L. Q. 467; Shattuck, supra note 9, at 931.
26. See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 116 and cases cited; Billig, supra
note 25, at 469-473; Note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 868 et seq. England refuses enforcement
hn re Hudson, 54 L. J. 811 (Ch. 1885). But it is urged the policy be changed by legis-
lation. Gr. BRrr. LAw REV. Comm., supra note 2, at 16.
27. Trustees of Bridgewater Academy v. Gilbert, 19 Mass. 579 (1S24); Trustees
of Hamilton College v. Stewart, 1 N. Y. 581 (1848); Barnes v. Perine, 12 N. Y. 18
(1854) ; cf. Amherst Academy v. Cowls, 23 Mass. 477 (1828). New York seems to have
clung most tenaciously to the implication. Keuka College v. Ray, 167 N. Y. 95, 60 X. E.
325 (1901) Allegheny College v. Nat. Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927).
But there are intimations that if it is impossible to imply a request, reliance will suffice.
I & I Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 276 N. Y. 427, 12 N. E. (2d) 532 (1938).
28. Beatty v. Western College, 177 Ill. 280, 52 N. E. 432 (1898); cf. In re Estate
of Griswold, 113 Neb. 256, 202 N. NV. 609 (1925). Compare the unreality of the impli-
cation of a request in the modem cases [School Dist. v. Sheidley, 138 Io. 672, 40 S. W.
656 (1897); Y. I. C. A. v. Estill, 140 Ga. 291, 78 S. E. 1075 (1913)] with the implica-
tion in the old cases where, with small communities, it had a basis in fact. Trustees v.
Allen, 14 Mass. 172 (1817); George v. Harris, 4 N. H. 533 (1829); Fremont Ferry and
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is made, however, that courts do not require proof of actual detriment, and
that although there have been cases denying enforcement when no reliance
was proved,20 there have also been intimations that no "consideration" is
necessary for a promise to charity.30 And the variety of reasoning applied
does in fact show a strong tendency to enforce such promises per se.
Yet assuming that reliance upon a promise is sufficient to raise a duty in
the promisor, a substantial number of the cases support the assumption in
theory, some on their facts apart from the legal rationale of the case. Where
reliance is not shown, moreover, it may fairly be presumed in view of the
purpose for which the subscription was obtained. If that be deemed unwar-
ranted, and the cases granting recovery where no reliance is shown are taken
with those intimating none is necessary, they are at least sub rosa authority
for the proposition that a sufficiently evidenced expectation which the court
thinks reasonable and strong enough will be sufficient without more to raise
a duty in the promisor not to disappoint it. Courts are of course impelled by
the fact that the promisee is an institution which must proceed at least in
part upon the theory such expectation interests will be protected. This easy
enforcement of charitable subscriptions is further dependent upon the idea
that social policy favors it, and as they are usually sued upon only after the
death of the promisor, there is little said to the contrary. It is questionable
whether such a result would persist in the face of a reversal of policy,31' or a
showing that the enforcement would work hardship upon the promisor or
his dependents. Then one would expect definite and substantial action in
reliance to be required. But even then the promise must be enforced to its
full amount or not at all, in view of the difficulty of apportioning any definite
action to any specific promise.
Gifts of Land: If possession has been taken and substantial improvements
made, equity will specifically enforce a parol contract for the sale of land
which would otherwise be unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.32 The
theory is that possession and improvements are part performance which either
Bridge Co. v. Fuhrman, 8 Neb. 99 (1879). Compare the business subscriptions. Homan
v. Steele, 18 Neb. 652, 26 N. W. 472 (1886) ; Sherwin v. Fletcher, 168 Mass. 413, 47
N. E. 197 (1897); Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114, 60 N. E. 397 (1901).
Other fictitious bases for enforcing charitable subscriptions are discussed in 1 WViILIs-
TON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 116; Billig, loc. cit. supra note 25; Shattuck, supra
note 9, at 931 et seq.
29. Shattuck, supra note 9, at 932, n. 76.
30. In re Estate of Griswold, 113 Neb. 256, 202 N. W. 609 (1925); Billig, supra
note 25, at 483, n. 51; Note (1925) 138 A. L. R. 868, 873.
31. See Reimensnyder v. Gans, 110 Pa. St. 17, 20, 2 Atl. 425, 428 (1885) re a stat-
ute rendering a charitable subscription without a fair consideration void if the donor
died within one month from its date: ". . . the statute is a wholesome one, designed
to protect the dying from the craft of priest and layman alike, when they come not to
minister comfort and spiritual consolation, but to gather spoil for some favorite char-
ity." See also (1928) 13 CORNT. L. Q. 270.
, 32. 2 JVILLISTONT, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936), § 494 and cases cited.
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serves as evidence, making a writing unnecessary, or estops the promisor from
setting up the Statute. Early objections that respect for the Statute required
that the promisee only be recompensed for his expenditures have not pre-
vailed,3 and specific performance is the general remedy. In a promise to
give land, possession and improvements not only remove the bar of the
Statute, but either serve as consideration or estop the promisor from asserting
lack of consideration. 34 The improvements must be substantial," and occa-
sionally the value of the expenditures alone has been given.3
From this parallel and the fact that courts have talked of fraud and estoppel
similarly in both instances it is a reasonable inference that the decisions in
the cases of a promise to make a gift of land result from an unwarranted
analogy to the cases of promises for an exchange within the Statute.3T It is
urged that justice would require that the promisee be reimbursed and sent
on his way, particularly where the expenditures do not approximate the value
of the land.38 It may well be that a wider recognition of the intermediate
remedy of reliance damages would lead to at least that much relief in the
cases where the improvements are held insubstantial. But it cannot be said
33. Foster v. Hale, 3 Ves. 696 (1798); Wainwright v. Talcott, 60 Conn. 43, 22 At.
484 (1891) ; Worth v. Worth, 84 Ill. 442 (1877).
34. Neale v. Neales, 9 Wall. 1 (U, S. 1869); Freeman v. Freeman, 43 N. Y. 34
(1870) ; 1 \NA.LISTOI.', Co-,mAcrs (Rev. ed. 1936) p. 499. The Massachusetts doctrine is
peculiarly strict. Morse v. AWinslow, 254 Mass. 407, 150 N. E. 158 (1926).
Licenses, being inherently revocable, are said not to be made enforceable by reliance
or consideration. WnLisTox, op. cit. supra at p. 498; CtLRK. COVE.ANTS AND INTE s S
Ruxz'IXG 'WITH THE LAND (1929) 46 et seq.; Shattuck, supra note 9, at 924 cf Jeq.
But there is substantial authority contra. Id. at 925, n. Ef: Albricht v. Drake Lumber
Co., 67 Fla. 310, 65 So. 98 (1914); Beard v. Link, 81 Ind. App. 293, 141 N. E. 792
1923) ; Rerick v. Kern, 14 S. & R. 267 (Pa. 1826).
35. Beall v. Clark, 71 Ga. 818 (1883); Perkins v. Perkins, 181 .Mass. 401, 63 N. E.
926 (1902); Griggsby v. Osborn, 82 Va. 371 (1886); Shattuck, supra note 9, at 921,
n. 44.
36. Usher's Ex'r v. Flood, 83 Ky. 552 (1886); ef. Mims v. Lockett, 33 Ga. 9 (1891);
Young v. Glendenning, 6 Watts. 509 (Pa. 1837) ; Shattuck, supra note 9, at 922, n. 45.
37. But there is a closely analogous group of cases where the promisee has mqved
from a distance in reliance on a promise to give land. Often the promise is enforced as
a bargain. Often there factually is none, and reliance is the only "consideration' Sce,
e.g., Howe v. Watson, 179 'Mass. 30, 60 N. E. 415 (1901); Brackenbury v. Hodgklin.
116 Me. 399, 102 At. 106 (1917). Greiner v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760, 293 Pac. 759 (1930)
cites RFSTATEMMINT, COXTRACTS (1928) § 90 as the basis for its decision. Contra: Kirk-
sey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845); cf. Chapel v. Chapel, 132 Minn. 86, 155 N. ,V. 1054
(1916). The reliance may be held to involve no damage. Brevator Y. Creech, 186 Mo.
558, 85 S. V. 527 (1905); Reed's Heirs v. Vannorsdale, 2 Leigh 569 (Va. 1831). Or
reliance may be too little. Dunshee v. Dunshee, 255 111. 296., 99 N. . 593 (1912). An-
other ground for non-enforcement is the lack of intention to be bound. "Assurances of
assistance accompanying kind advice are never intended as contracts. And conformance
to advice is never intended to stand as legal consideration . . ." Richards' Ex'r v. Rich-
ards, 46 Pa. 78, 82 (1863).
38.^ Shattuck, supra note 9, at 919-924.
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the courts have not had the remedy at hand if they wished to use it.a9 More-
over it is difficult to see why the promisor who has stood by and seen both
the possession and the making of improvements should be let off with less
than his word. The feeling that the promisee is getting something for nothing
is carried over from the case of a contract to sell, where the promisor receives
his bargained-for exchange. In the promise to give he has asked no exchange.
In both cases the promisee is given his expectation of the land, unless in the
promise to sell the consideration is grossly inadequate 40 or in the promise
to give the reliance too little.41 It seems unnecessary that the substitution of
action in reliance for a bargained-for exchange should affect the disposition
of the expectation interest.
It may be argued that, by giving the expectation interest, action in reliance
becomes an anomalous reason to enforce a promise,42 and that it would be
as well to enforce promises with no reliance at all. But traditionally, the law
has demanded something in the way of a reason for enforcing the promise
and an assurance that the promise can be taken to have been intended to be
carried out. Only then will the expectations of the promisee be protected,
Consideration itself concededly has somewhat of an evidential function.43
Definite action in reliance on the promise serves the purpose as well as a
bargained-for exchange.44 Judicial reasoning in terms of estoppel and fraud
-saying the promisee would be defrauded were the promise not enforced-
is significant. It has been argued there can be no estoppel by promise because
there is no fraud in change of mind,45 and that even if there were the promisee
39. See cases cited supra note 36.
40. 5 WILmsTo-, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 1428 and authorities cited; RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 367 (a).
41. See cases cited supra note 35.
42. In a moral atmosphere that would hold a bargain the sine qua non of promise
enforcement it may seem odd to be compelled to perform a promise for which tile prol-
isor was to receive nothing. See Holmes, supra note 3. Further, liability by unbargained.
for detriment is ex post facto, and it can be urged that the promisor cannot predict what
his rights and duties will be. But the various legal reasons for enforcing promises are
not matters of philosophic truth but to a large extent devices to safeguard against in-
position. So it seems unnecessary that a promisor have any more certainty of prediction
than that he will be expected to keep his word.
43. See Lord Mansfield in Pillans v. Van Microp, 3 Burr. 1663, 1669 (K. B. 1765];
HOLMES, THE CoImuosoN LAw (1881) 259. Compare the fact that possession and improve-
ments will do away with the necessity for a writing in a contract for the sale of land
within the Statute of Frauds.
44. As has been seen, there are instances, notably charitable subscriptions and mar-
riage settlements, where the promise may be enforced without either consideration or
action in reliance. But note that these promises are almost invariably in writing.
45. Starry v. Korab, 65 Iowa 267, 21 N. W. 600 (1884) ; Prescott v, Jones, 69 N. H.
305, 41 Atl. 352 (1898) ; Jordan v. Money, 5 H. L. Cas. 185 (1854) ; Alderson v. Mad-
dison, 5 Ex. D. 293 (1879-80). But often the promise is such an indefinite expression
of intention that reliance is unreasonable. Keating v. Orne, 77 Pa. St. 89 (1874); cf.
Marsh v. Bridgeport, 75 Conn. 495, 54 AtL. 196 (1903) ; Wisconsin & M. Ry. v. Powers,
191 U. S. 379 (1903) ; Plumer v. Lord, 9 Allen 455 (Mass. 1864) ; Langdon v. Dowd,
10 Allen 433 (Mass. 1865).
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should nevertheless be limited to reliance damages. Conventional estoppel-
estoppel in pais-is based on the false statement of an existing fact, and, if
it should be beyond the power of the speaker to make his statement true,
it may be that damages can only be assessed in terms of reliance. But where
the speaker can make the statement true, he has generally been compelled to. 0
And in what is called promissory estoppel it is always within the speaker's
power to fulfill his words. Because reliance is required to deprive him of the
privilege of changing his mind is no reason it need limit the duty. Calling the
estoppel one by fraud is the statement of the conclusion that the promisor
has come to owe a duty co-extensive with the terms of his promise0 7 Such
a duty is a contract.
B. OTHER PROMIsEs
In passing from promises to make a gift the problems involved take on
added complexity. There, with the exception of the charitable subscription
cases, the promisee is usually a near relative or close friend, and in general the
promisor is dead and thus unobjecting when suit is brought. Conceptions of
contract are more readily tempered by conceptions of morality and justice.
But, where the promises are in general concerned with business of one sort
or another, contract conceptions, offer and acceptance as well as considera-
tion, are more likely to prevail, and expediency and business custom are
added factors tending to create a different morality. The reasonableness of
reliance will thus vary widely according to the situation. But it is necessary
to rely upon promises in order that business may be transacted with con-
venience, and, despite the standardized contract, there are still many such
promises which lack conventional consideration. Reliance has therefore played
46. Bold v. Hutchinson, 20 Beav. 250 (1855); Dayhood v. Neely. 135 Miss. 14, 99
So. 440 (1924); International Products Co. v. Erie R. R., 244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. C62
(1927) (damages the same whether by reliance or by the statement fulfilled); Fuller,
supra note 9, at 406, citing authorities contra. There is a considerable body of decisions
holding that where A gives his note or signature to a bank to bolster its assets he must
pay after reliance by third parties. See, e.g., Golden v. Cervenka, 278 Iil. 409, 116 N. E.
273 (1917); Prudential Trust Co. v. Moore, 245 Mass. 311, 139 N. E. 645 (1923); cf.
Lawrence-Cedarhurst Bank v. Ruth, 162 Misc. 82, 294 N. Y. Supp. 810 (Sup. Ct. 1937),
(1938) 48 YALE L. J. 326. Although the cases can be analyzed as enforcing promises
by third party reliance, it seems more accurate to consider them as cases of estoppel in
pais-as representations that the note is a valid asset in the hands of the bank. However,
the distinction is purely doctrinal.
47. Compare the opinion that the basis for some contract liability was deceit. See
RESTATE ENT, Cox-rRAcrs (1928) 245, explanatory note to §90; GT. BaiT. LAw Rsv.
Comm., loc. cit. supra note 2. See also Finlay v. Swirsky, 103 Conn. 624, (31, 131 AtL.
420, 423 (1925) : "And so it has been said that every sufficient consideration, although
not technically an estoppel, contains the substantial elements of an estoppel in Pais, for
if a man by his promise induces another to change his situation and is then permitted
to deny the validity of the promise, he is thus perpetrating a fraud and injuring another
by a false promise. The law will not permit this, but will hold him to the fulfillment of
his undertaking."
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its part here also as evidencing the need for a legal duty in the promisor.
The expectation of the promisee that the promise may be relied upon is at
least indicative that such is the custom and such should be the law.
As would be expected, the promises easiest to enforce by action in reliance
are those not involving an affirmative undertaking on the part of the promisor.
Promises or conduct implying an assurance not to plead the statute of limita-
tions,48 to extend a redemption period, 49 or not to insist upon part of a
contractual right 5" are made enforceable by the induced inaction of the
promisee whether bargained-for or not. An application to have the life of
a patent reduced, made under a mistake of law, upon which a third party
increased his business, has estopped the patentee from suing the third party.51
A promise by a bank to look solely to the maker of a note for payment,
wherefore the indorser did not file his claim against the maker ;52 a promise
to accept thirty per cent of a debt inducing the debtor not to go into bank-
ruptcy;53 a promise not to enforce a dower right in land, wherefore the
buyer bought ; 4 and a promise not to foreclose a mortgage, wherefore the
mortgagor made improvements, have been enforced.5 But in the famous
Petterson v. Pattberg,56 a relinquishment of a right was held unenforce-
able on doctrines of offer and acceptance. In that case the promisee was put
in no worse position by reason of his reliance, save for wasted effort, than
if the promise had not been made. In the cases listed above the promisee
would have been misled to his loss and the status quo would have been un-
48. McLearn v. Hill, 276 Mass. 519, 177 N. E. 617 (1931) ; Renackowsky v. Board
of Comm'rs, 122 Mich. 613, 81 N. XV. 581 (1900); Utica Ins. Co. v. Bloodgood, 4 Wend.
652 (N. Y. 1830). Of course the forbearance of the creditor is often bargained for.
But cf. Phillips v. Phillips, 163 Cal. 530, 127 Pac. 346 (1912) where a creditor's pronise
not to sue for 10 years estopped the debtor to plead the statute although the debtor had
evidently said nothing. Contra: Burnett v. Turner, 105 Ark. 290, 151 S. W. 249 (1912) ;
Shapeley v. Abbott, 42 N. Y. 443 (1870); cf. Langdon v. Doud, 10 Allen 433 (Mass.
1895).
49. Schroeder v. Young, 161 U. S. 334 (1896); Daniel v. Daniel, 190 Ky. 210, 226
S. W. 1070 (1921) ; Dow v. Bradley, 110 Me. 249, 85 Atd. 896 (1913).
50. Little v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 123 Mass. 380 (1877); Underwood Typewriter Co.
v. Century Realty Co., 220 Mo. 522, 119 S. W. 400 (1909); Merchant's Nat. Bank v.
Voudouris, 248 S. W. 810 (Tex. 1923); cf. Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N. Y.
447, 127 N. E. 263 (1920). Contra: Bragg v. Danielson, 141 Mass. 195, 4 N. E. 622
(1886); cf. Marsh v. City of Bridgeport, 75 Conn. 495, 54 Atd. 196 (1903). The parol
evidence rule may be insuperable. Insurance Co. v. Mowry, 96 U. S. 544 (1877). But e/.
Lechler v. Montana Life Ins. Co., 48 N. D. 644, 186 N. W. 271 (1921) (subsequent
agreement).
51. Edison Electric Light Co. v. Buckeye Electric Co., 59 Fed. 691 (C. C. N. D.
Ohio 1894).
52. Bulloch v. First Nat. Bank, 196 Iowa 522, 194 N. W. 930 (1923).
53. Melroy v. Kemmerer, 218 Pa. 381, 67 Atl. 699 (1907).
54. Wire v. Wyman, 93 Ind. 392 (1883).
55. Faxton v. Faxon, 28 Mich. 159 (1873); Roe v. Fleming, 32 Okla. 259, 122 Pac.
496 (1912) ; cf. McNeil v. Call, 19 N. H. 403 (1849).
56. 248 N. Y. 86, 161 N. E. 428 (1928).
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restorable were the promise not fully enforced. Yet the decision in Petterson
v. Pattberg seems harsh.
The problem becomes more acute when the promise involves affirmative
action. It may seem more reasonable to require a quid pro quo before imposing
an affirmative duty. Nevertheless tie affirmative duty has been imposed in a
variety of situations. A promise by a debtor to secure his debt is enforce-
able because of the creditor's induced forbearance to proceed immediately
against him.YT The same result has generally been reached where a promise
of payment by A has led a creditor not to proceed against his debtor B.- s
The underlying theory in most cases probably is that if the forbearance was
not bargained-for it should have been, either because it was a benefit to the
promisor or because the promisee should be expected to consider it so.
If a tacit understanding is evident, the lack of formal promise or bargain
is immaterial, the basic theory being the expectability of fulfillment whether
the motions of bargain have been performed or not. And it is a short step
from a bargain implicit to a bargain implied, and thence perhaps to the
enforcement of promises purely by reliance without implying a bargain.0 0
Unilateral Contracts: In what are called offers for a unilateral contract
there is much doctrine that would hold there has been no acceptance and no
consideration until the requested performance has been completed.0 Until
then the offeree has been presumed to be free to discontinue and the offeror
to revoke his offer. Although the hardship of this is apparent, it has been
urged that the offeror is privileged to qualify his offer in any way he pleases,
and caveat offeree. From the business point of view, the better practice has
been to allow him to restrict the terms of his offer, yet to hold him to his
promise if the accepting performance has been commenced, giving the acceptor
a reasonable time to complete.0 ' It has been stated that the action must be
part of the requested performance and not mere preparation. The cases so
holding are often those where a request for a counter promise has been found
57. Alliance Bank Ltd. v. Broom, 2 Drew. & Sm. 289 (Ch. 1864); Hay v. Fortier,
116 Me. 455, 102 At!. 294 (1917), Comment (1918) 27 YALE, L. J. 535; Fluckey Y. An-
derson, 132 Neb. 664, 273 N. W. 41 (1937) [REsTATEM ET, CONrncts (1932) §90
cited].
58. Bowen v. Tipton, 64 Md. 275, 1 At. 861 (1885); Saunders v. Galbraith, 40 Ohio
App. 155, 178 N. E. 34 (1931) [REsT,LT.E.ME_.T, CoNTP-crS (192,.) § 90 cited], (1932)
80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 594. Contra: Manter v. Churchill, 127 Mass. 31 (1879); Strong v.
Sheffield, 144 N. \Y. 392, 39 N. E. 330 (1895); cf. McCowen v. McCord, 49 Ga. App. 353,
175 S. E. 593 (1934).
59. See Wigan v. English & Scottish Law Life Ins. Ass., [1909] 1 Ch. 291, 293.
60. Campbell Inv. Co. v. Taylor, 246 Ill. App. 433 (1927); Petterson v. Pattbarg,
248 N. Y. 86, 161 N. E. 428 (1928) ; 1 WnLSTo-, CoNnAcrS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 60.
61. Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal. 654, 67 Pac. 108 (1902) ; 1 WIn-
LISTON, CoxTr. crs (Rev. ed. 1936) § 60A; REST.XnME.T, CoNm-mcrs (1932) § 45;
Ballantine, Acceptance of Offers for Unilateral Contracts by Partial Perfornalcc of
Service Requested (1921) 5 Min-. L. REv. 94; Corbin, Offer and Acceptance and Some
of the Resulting Legal Relations (1917) 26 Y.LE L. J. 167; see discussion in Llewellyn,
Our Case Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance H (1939) 4S YALE L J. 779.
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or implied.62 In fact it is usually difficult to distinguish between preparation
and performance.
Exclusive Agencies: The exclusive agency cases are illustrative of this
difficulty. The promise may be enforced because the agent has nearly con-
tracted with a buyer or because he has spent time and money seeking one.03
Either could be called part performance or preparation. In the case of an
exclusive agency it is true that the promisee could give a consideration to
make the promise irrevocable,"4 but the promisor likewise could phrase his
promise so the agent would not be led to rely upon an exclusive agency.
Courts often speak of the agent's performance as implying a counter-promise,
but the analysis is belied not only by the fact the agent is probably still not
bound, but also by the fact the promise is not enforced if the action taken in
reliance is small or incidental. 65 Any action would presumably serve as well
as more to evidence a counter-promise. The form of the promise, followed by
the agent's definite and expectable reliance, ground the duty. And if the agent
has done enough work to bind the promisor at all, he should be allowed the
full benefit of the promise. Although the case might seem one where reliance
damages alone could well be given, G and should be where the provable dam-
ages are held insufficient to ground a promissory duty, it is impossible to
calculate the value of commissions the agent might have earned elsewhere,
and out-of-pocket expenses obviously will not wholly compensate him. Giving
the promised commission is therefore the better solution.
' Options: As the exclusive agencies are made capable of enforcement by
action in reliance because the terms of the promise make reliance reasonable, it
seems the same result must follow in the case of options. Admittedly, neither
a general listing of land with a real estate broker nor a statement land is for
sale would be made binding by any amount of reliance by the broker-agent
or by a prospective purchaser. But when the promise is limited to an exclusive
agency or an exclusive option for a given time, the reasonableness and
expectability of reliance is the same in either case. Perhaps it is because the
62. See, e.g., Stensgaard v. Smith, 43 Minn. 11, 44 N. W. 669 (1890); Strong v.
Sheffield, 144 N. Y. 392, 39 N. E. 330 (1895); White v. Corlies, 46 N. Y. 467 (1871)
(reliance very small). Stensgaard v. Smith would seem to have been overruled by Lap-
ham v. Flint, 86 Minn. 376, 90 N. V. 780 (1902).
63. Harris v. McPherson, 97 Conn. 164, 115 At. 723 (1921) ; Braniff v. Baler, 101
Kan. 117, 165 Pac. 816 (1917) ; cf. Bassick Mfg. Co. v. Riley, 9 F. (2d) 138 (E. D. Pa.
1925). Contra: Auerbach v. Internationale Wolfraun Lampen Aktien Gesellsehaft, 177
Fed. 458 (S. D. N. Y. 1910); E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Claiborne-Reno Co.,
64 F. (2d) 224 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933),
64. Kelp Ore Remedies Corp. v. Brooten, 129 Ore. 357, 277 Pac. 716 (1929) ($1
consideration sufficient).
65. Schoenmann v. Whitt, 136 Wis. 332, 117 N. W. 851 (1908); cf. Curtiss Candy
Co. v. Silberman, 45 F. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930).
66. In Schwarz v. Lou-Ala Inv. Co., 23 Ala. App. 498, 127 So. 786 (1930), reliance
damages alone seem to be given. And see Kolb v. Bennett Land Co., 74 Miss. 567, 569,
21 So. 233, 234 (1897).
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action in reliance of the exclusive agent is apt to be like performance of a
unilateral contract, while reliance upon a gratuitous option is not, that gra-
tuitous options have not been so frequently enforced. But substantial reliance
should be sufficient to make such promises binding."
Promises of an option for a time certain are in reality most conducive to
reliance. They have been upheld where the consideration was obviously
nominal, s and while it is here again true that the promisee could have his
option by thus paying consideration, yet the promisor could as easily refrain
from phrasing his promise so it leads to reliance. Between the two, payment
of consideration seems merely a form for the wary, and the form of the
promise the substance of the matter. The reliance of the promisee should
generally either cause the promise to be irrevocable or be of no effect at all,
depending upon the terms of the promise and the extent of the reliance.
There might, of course, be cases where only reliance damages would achieve
justice between the parties, but any reliance sufficient to make a suit for
reparation worth the bringing should be sufficient to enforce the option itself.
Either relief should be altogether denied under a principle of de ;ninhnis, or if
the promise is to carry a duty, the tendency should be to extend the duty
to the terms of the promise as a conventional contractual obligation rather
than to the makeshift reparatory duty. The expectation of the promisee is
as worthy of protection after reliance as after a nominal consideration given.
In either case the expectation is created and limited by the promise. It is
no more just, upon the promisor's non-performance, to restore to the promisee
the amount of his reliance than it would be to return to him the consideration
he gave. To say that reliance cannot invoke the promissory duty because mere
reliance is not consideration is pure question-begging, especially in view of the
behavior of courts in assimilating the two. 9 Indeed, courts have only recently
distinguished between them. Furthermore, in both the option and exclusive
agency cases the promisor either gets his stipulated return or loses nothing
67. Wilson v. Spry, 145 Ark. 21, 223 S. W. 564 (1920); Spitzli v. Guth, 112 Misc.
630, 183 N. Y. Supp. 743 (Sup. Ct. 1920). Contra: Comstock Bros. v. North, SS 2,Miss.
754, 41 So. 374 (1906) ($5,000 reliance, option revocable); Corbett v. Cronklite, 239
Ill. 9 (1909) ($25.reliance); Texas Co. v. Dunn, 219 S. NV. 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920)
(same). In Ganss v. Guffey Petroleum Co., 125 App. Div. 760, 110 N. Y. Supp. 176 (1st
Dep't 1908) reliance of $150 upon an option to purchase a ship for Z85,000 was held in a
3 to 2 decision not to make the option binding. But the parties had agreed to a higher
price, reserving to the buyer the right to sue for the difference. See Gr. BmT. LA*v REv.
Com., supra note 2, at 23, urging that an option for a definite time be irrevocable.
68. Smith v. Bangham, 156 Cal. 359, 104 Pac. 689 (1909) ($1.00 consideration
makes an option to buy land worth $17,000 binding).
69. There may be very important questions yet to be answered as to whether a prom-
ise should always be enforced in full and as to when the giving of reliance damages would
better serve society. But assuming the problem, it in no wise follows that the answer
to the very practical question of how much the plaintiff should recover is to be found
in the distinction in legal doctrine between a bargained-for exchange and reliance. Doc-
trines developed to determine whether liability exists at all should not control the extent
of the liability.
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but other opportunities to sell, which loss is presumably offset by the in-
creased opportunity to sell to or through the exclusive promisee.
Gratuitous Undertakings: The cases of gratuitous undertakings go deepest
into the history of the common law, being part o*f the ancient law of bailments
and to some extent the basis of assumpsit.70 The amorphous character of
their beginning and the conflicting claims of tort and contract categories have
led to considerable opinion that the liability created is of a type all its own."1
One principle is fairly certain: a gratuitous undertaking entered upon and
improperly performed will result in liability.72 Whether the duty is truly of
tort or of contract or truly neither is perhaps of only academic importance.
The duty is the same whether it be grounded in the promise or imposed by
law, and so the measure of damages. When the facts are such that it is
impossible to say the promisor has commenced the undertaking, the various
bases for the imposition of liability become more important. Either the tort
duty must be extended to deprive the term non-feasance of its traditional
immunizing force, or the contractual duty must be extended by reason of
reliance. It is true that courts have been readier to impose liability where
there has been something entrusted to the promisor- chattel78 or note 4 -
and the duty could be fictionally conceived of as an extension of the bailee's
duty to use due care. But liability has been imposed without the something
given,7 5 and insofar as the liability springs from the fact of a promise, the
70. AMES, loc. cit. supra note 2; 1 CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING AND PRMoEDUt E (1930)
275-286; HOLIMES, op. cit. supra note 2, at 275 et seq.; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed.
1936) § 138.
71. Beale, Gratuitous Undertakings (1891) 5 HAR. L, REV. 222; Arterburn, IhdbiI-
ity for Breach of Gratuitous Promises (1927) 22 ILL. L. REv. 161. The latter author
says liability is, or should be, sui gencris; but his argument that liability cannot properly
be of tort because the duty is affirmative seems wrong. The duty may be as easily thought
of as negative, i.e., a duty not to promise unless prepared to carry out the promise-prac-
tically speaking the same duty that attaches as soon as the undertaking is entered upon.
72. Coggs v. Bernard, 1 Salk. 26 (K. B. 1703); Ralli Bros. v. Walford Lilies, Ltd.,
13 Lloyd's List L. R. 223 (H. L. 1922) (promise to insure) ; Barile v. Wright, 256 N. Y.
1, 175 N. E. 351 (1931) (same).
73. Schroeder v. Mauzy, 16 Cal. App. 443, 118 Pac. 459 (1911); Siegel v. Spear,
234 N. Y. 479, 138 N. E. 414 (1923) (promise to insure).
74. Mayhew v. Glazier, 68 Colo. 350, 189 Pac. 843 (1920) (promise to insure);
Moore v. Gholson, 34 Miss. 372 (1857) (promise to collect claims) ; Herzig v. Herzig,
67 Misc. 250, 122 N. Y. Supp. 440 (Sup. Ct. 1910) (promise to collect a note); cf.
Stone v. Demarest, 95 Misc. 543, 159 N. Y. Supp. 800 (1st Dep't 1916).
75. Lusk-Harbison-Jones, Inc. v. Universal Credit Co., 164 Miss. 693, 145 So. 623
(1933) [promise to insure, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 90 cited] ; Kirby v. Brown,
229 App. Div. 155, 241 N. Y. Supp. 255 (1st Dep't 1930) (promise to bid oil property) ;
Watkins v. James, 48 N. C. 195 (1855) (promise to procure a draft) ; cf. Johnson v. Long-
ley, 142 Ga. 814, 83 S. E. 952 (1914). Contra: Elsee v. Gatward, 5 T. R. 143 (K. 13.
1793) (promise to repair a house) ; Spillane v. Yarmalowicz, 252 Mass. 168, 147 N. E.
571 (1925); Tomko v. Sharp, 87 N. J. Law 385, 94 Atl. 793 (1915) (promise to return
car'from garage) ; Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 (N. Y. 1809) (promise to insure);
Comfort v. McCorkle, 149 Misc. 826, 268 N. Y. Supp. 192 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (promise to
(Vol. 48. 10361048
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duty would seem to fall more properly under contract. In Coggs v. Bernard70
the defendant undertook to carry wine and spilled it. His negligence pro-
duced the damage regardless of promise; the duty breached was always with
him, namely, not to break the cask. Where one has promised to insure for
another, and does so, but improperly, he is liable upon the destruction of
the property not because he has damaged the property nor because he has
increased the risk of damage, but because he has not performed his promise,
which promise caused the risk to go unprovided for. He had no duty to insure
until he promised. The duty there would seem to be contractual, and the line
generally drawn dividing improperly insuring from not insuring at all 7 must
surely be the result of mistaken technicality.
The tendency to carry over into the contract category the distinction be-
tween non-action and action improperly executed is of course attributable to
the indeterminate origin of the gratuitous undertaking cases. For as far as
the ultimate basis of liability is concerned, there may be no real distinction
between such a case as Seigel v. Spcar7 8 where liability was imposed for the
non-performance of a promise to insure, and the group of cases including
MacPherson v. Buick79 and Glanzer v. Shpard.80 In the latter line of de-
cisions the duty so to conduct oneself as not to harm another was extended
so as to require a manufacturer not to increase the risk of physical damage
by sending out a defective car, and to require a public weigher not to increase
the risk of pecuniary loss by issuing a false statement certifing the weight
of beans. These duties were imposed, despite the doctrine of privity of con-
tract, by conceiving the defective car to be like harmful conduct, if it cause
damage, and the false statement to be like a defective car-a dangerous thing
to let loose in the world. As one may in general rely upon the proper conduct
of one's neighbor so may one in general rely upon the soundness of a car and
the integrity of a statement. In Seigel v. Spear the contractual duty was
imposed. There enforced was a promise to insure upon which another relied,
in that he did not himself insure. It is true that the plaintiff in Glanzer v.
Shepard was damaged because he relied not on a promise but on a Statement,
wherefore he did not weigh the beans himself; yet the identity of consequence
should point out that the difference in the legal doctrine applied is merely
a matter of convenience in achieving a result. Conduct, car, statement, and
promise may bring liability if they cause another harm. Basically each line
file a claim). The Restatement of Agency would impose liability. REs-r.AXwEi, AGrcv.L-"
(1933) § 378; and see REST.ATEmExT, To'rs (1934) § 325.
76. 1 Salk. 26 (K. B. 1703).
77. Wilkinson v. Coverdale, 1 Esp. 75 (K. B. 1793) (negligent insuring, liability);
Barile v. Wright, 256 N. Y. 1, 175 N. E. 351 (1931) (same); Spillane v. Yarmclovicz,
252 fass. 168, 147 N. E. 571 (1925) (failure to have plaintiff's name inserted in policy,
no liability); Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 (N. Y. 1809) (failure to insure, no liability).
78. 234 N. Y. 479, 138 N. E. 414 (1923).
79. 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
80. 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922).
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of cases is authority for the other. Yet the situations are not wholly the
same, and the very presence of a promise seems to turn the legal rationale
to contract. Certainly the promise is one "the performance of which the law
in some way recognizes as a duty,"'8 and the presence of such a promise makes
the case one of contract rather than of tort. There is therefore no reason for
distinguishing between the negligent performance of the promise and its non-
performance, a dichotomy responsible for an unfortunate and confusing body
of tort law. The damage is precisely the same, of course, in either event, and
recovery the same upon any theory.
A further analogy can be drawn between the two classes of cases. In Gan-
zer v. Shepard the duty of the weigher to speak with care if he spoke at all
was imposed because the defendant knew the plaintiff .would rely on his state-
ment. In Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, Niven & Company,8 2 a similar
liability was denied, whether rightly or wrongly, because it was thought the
defendant could not have foreseen the reliance of any particular person, and
further because the burden of responsibility upon him would be too great.
A sufficient closeness of relationship-determinableness of who will rely-
to make reliance reasonable and expectable, is also required in the gratuitous
undertaking cases before any duty will be imposed.83 And although there are
other factors affecting the reasonableness of reliance, the burden of the prom-
ise to the promisor, should it be enforced, frequently seens determinative.
Thus in Brawn v. Lyford8 4 the defendant's promise to send an insurance
policy to the company to -be assigned was not enforced, although defendant
was bailee of the policy and the building subsequently burned. Liability
would have made him the insurer. In Carr v. Maine Central Railroad", the
defendant owed plaintiff a rebate which could not be paid without the assent
of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The plaintiff delivered the necessary
papers to defendant, which undertook to send them to the Commission and
did not. Liability was imposed, but the defendant had only to pay what it
owed the plaintiff anyway. Although liability has been imposed where Brawn
v. Lyford denied it,"6 and the authority of Thorne v. Deas T has been ques-
81. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 1.
82. 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931), modified in, State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst,
278 N. Y. 104, 15 N. E. (2d) 416 (1938), rearguinent denied, 278 N. Y. 234, 16 N. E.
(2d) 851 (1938). See also Moch Co., Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. 160,
159 N. E. 896 (1928).
83. At least such a state of facts has always existed in the cases. The requirement
of a certain privity, however, seems inseparable from considerations of burden, should
liability be imposed. Cf. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M, & W. 109 (Ex. 1842).
- 84. 103 fe. 362, 69 At. 544 (1907).
85. 78 N. H. 502, 102 At. 532 (1917).
86. Schroeder v. Mauzy, 16 Cal. App. 443, 118 Pac. 459 (1911); Mayhew v. Glazier,
68 Colo. 350, 189 Pac. 843 (1920); Lusk-Harbison-Jones, Inc. v. Universal Credit Co.,
164 Miss. 693, 145 So. 623 (1933) ; Siegel v. Spear, 234 N. Y. 479, 138 N. E. 414 (1923).
87. 4 Johns. 84 (N. Y. 1809)-the leading American case refusing liability for the
non-performance of a gratuitous agency.
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tioned, 8 the treatment of the gratuitous undertaking cases shows that empha-
sis is laid in some cases not so much on the reliance as on the promise. The
reliance is always the same, namely non-action, but the extent of loss increas-
es directly with the extent of the promise. So the greater the burden of the
promise to the promisor the less reasonable the reliance upon another to per-
form it gratuitously,89 and the promisee may retain a duty to look out for
himself.90
Conclusion: It is certain that consideration in the sense of a bargained-for
exchange has not been found satisfactory as an e.xchtsie device for enforc-
ing promises.9' As the only other means to create the promised duty, action
in reliance may seem to have unduly cx post facto operation. Yet it is doubt-
ful that the problematical surprise of a defendant bound by action in reliance
is a matter for sympathy. As has been seen, the requisite amount of reliance
has varied in different situations. Perhaps the requirement of "substantial"
reliance may give the matter a more delictual aspect than is desirable, but it
may be that a sort of burden of proof has been put upon the promisee, rather
than that the enforceability of the promise has been made to depend upon the
greatness of the injustice of non-enforcement. In the marriage settlement
and charitable subscription cases can be found examples of promises includ-
ing duties for no perceptible doctrinal reason, but merely because the courts
think enforcement is proper. And the employee benefit promises, stipulated
to be non-binding, are made enforceable by the employee continuing work as
usual, 92 although in any other situation there would probably be no "consid-
88. Siegel v. Spear, 234 N. Y. 479, 484, 138 -N. E. 414. 416 (1923).
89. NTor is this principle limited to the gratuitous undertaking cases. Compare Charles
E. Quincy, &-Co. Arbitrage Corp. v. Cities Service Co., 1.t4 Misc. 83, 282 X. Y. Stpp.
294 (Sup. Ct. 1935) -vth Simmons v. Randforce Amusement Corp., 102 Misc. 491, 293
N. Y. Supp. 745 (M6un. Ct. 1937) and De La Bere %. Pearson, Ltd. [19071 1 K. B. 4R3
(C. A.).
90. It may be worth noting that looked at in another way, in that the reliance cun-
sists of doing nothing, the gratuitous undertaking cases are further authority for the
proposition that mere ex-pectation, although it must be reasonable, is sufficient to create
the duty to satisfy the expectation in him who aroused it.
91. See Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co., Ltd. v. Selfridge, [1915] A. C. 847, 855; PoUNFO,
Ax ITRODucniox TO THE PHUMOSOPHY OF LAW (1922) 271 et seq.; Ballantine, Is the
Doctrine of Consideration Senseless and Illogical? (1913) 11 Macir. L. REv. 423; Wright,
Ought the Doctrine of Consideration to be Abolished front the Commtion Law? (193f)
49 HAv. L. REv. 1225. Lord Wright points out the distinction between the civil law,
taking contractual intent as its criterion of promise enforcement, and the common law,
requiring something outside of intent. It is hoped this comment also shows that the latter
criterion is a backhanded way of discovering the former. The doctrine of consideration
is discredited precisely insofar as it fails to do so. Hence the importance of preserving
reliance as a further device to enforce the whole promise, or not, as justice requires.
92. Tilbert v. Eagle Lock Co., 116 Conn. 357, 165 Atl. 205 (1933) ; Psutka V. Mich-
igan Alkali Co., 274 Mfich. 318, 264 N. WV. 385 (1936), (1936) 36 CoL L. Rm. 996; ef.
Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 517, 137 -N. IN. 769 (1912). Contra: Meyerson
v. New Idea Hosiery Co., 217 Ala. 153, 115 So. 94 (1927); cf. McGovern V. City of
New York, 234 N. Y. 377, 138 N. E. 26 (1923) ; Shear Co. Y. Harrington, 26 S. IN.
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eration" and the force of the promisee's expectation would go for nothing.
In general something tangible must take place because of the promise, such as
marriage or continued employment, 93 and in the vast majority of the cases
the action in reliance has made-the full promise enforceable. Authority hold-
ing that the reliance, rather than the promise, should limit the duty is negli-
gible.
Reliance may be no better an exclusive test than consideration, but if con-
sideration is to be definitively limited to a bargained-for exchange, there are
occasions where action in reliance must be invoked as an indispensable stipple-
ment. Where it is felt that the parties, had they intended to contract, would
have contracted by offer and acceptance, the reliance doctrine is less frequently
applied.94 If reliance and contractual intent are both clear, there is no reason
why the absence of a bargain need compel a court either to refuse relief or
to limit the relief to reliance damages. Courts should have all possible tools
with which to enforce a promise, and not be bound to one. They have been
fully capable of distinguishing those promises which were not intended to
create a legal obligation ;95 they should be permitted to enforce those which
were. It is not that in a citable case they have not reached the desired result,
but that the very vigor of contractual doctrines has been too restrictive upon
equally citable occasion. As far as action in reliance is concerned, courts
look on the one hand to the promisee to see if there is sufficient reason to
enforce the repudiated promise, and on the other to the promise to see if
the action of the promisee was such as would be expectable. Their purpose,
as in all contracts, is to protect reasonable expectations which society takes
an interest in fulfilling.
554 (Tex. 1924). Compare also Kiser v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
194 S. E. 727 (Va. 1938), where a union's promise to keep up plaintiff's salary should
she be discharged from work because of joining the union was enforced.
93. Shear Co. v. Harrington, 266 S. W. 554 (Tex. 1924).
94. Compare the great weight of authority enforcing promises to make a gift by rea-
son of reliance with the fewer cases enforcing promises by reliance in the business setting.
95. See, e.g., Weeks v. Tybald, Noy 11 (K. B. 1605); Wisconsin & M. Ry. v. Pow-
ers, 191 U. S. 379 (1903); Higgins v. Lessig, 49 Ill. App. 459 (1893); Unangst v.
Unangst, 213 Iowa 1064, 240 N. W. 618 (1932); Walker v. Walker, 175 Mass. 3,19, 56
N. E. 601 (1900); Keller v. Holderman, 11 Mich. 248 (1863); cf. Grimes v. Ilaker,
132 Neb. 898, 273 N. W. 789 (1937), aff'd, 133 Neb. 517, 275 N. W. 860 (1937). Com-
pare further In re Greene, 45 F. (2d) 428 (S. D. N. Y. 1930). See also Wright, sapra
note 91, at 1227 et seq.
96. See, e.g., Alderson v. Maddison, 5 Ex. D. 293 (1879-80) ; Bragg v. Danielson,
141 Mass. 195, 4 N. E. 622 (1886); Comstock Bros. v. North, 88 Miss. 754, 41 So. 374
(1906) ; Tomko v. Sharp, 87 N. J. Law 385, 94 At. 793 (1915) ; Comfort v. McCorkle,
149 Misc. 826, 268 N. Y. Supp. 192 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
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